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COMMENTARY
THE REGULATION OF ACCOUNTING- SOME
ECONOMIC ISSUES
Daniel R. Fischel*
The regulation of accounting has become a very controver-
sial area. My purpose here is to touch briefly on the relevance of
principles of economics to three interrelated issues: (1) the func-
tion of accountants; (2) the incentives of accountants to remain
independent; and (3) the role of liability rules in assuring qual-
ity performance by accountants. Without an understanding of
relevant economic principles, it is impossible, in my view, to dis-
cuss any of these issues in a meaningful way.
I.
Publicly held corporations are characterized by separation
of the management from the risk-bearing functions. This separa-
tion allows investors to capture the benefits of specialization of
function but subjects them to the risk that their funds will be
used for managers' personal benefit. Investors also realize that,
in most instances, they lack the expertise and the incentive to
monitor managers' actions. As a result, investors discount the
price they are willing to pay for shares when firms attempt to
raise capital. To minimize the size of this discount, those who
raise capital have strong incentives to establish institutional ar-
rangements that facilitate the monitoring of managerial per-
formance. Such arrangements minimize the probability that
managers will be able to profit at investors' expense.
Independent accountants are one type of monitoring ar-
rangement. By examining a firm's books and records and opin-
ing on whether management's representations reflect the true
state of the firm, accountants minimize the need for investors to
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engage in costly monitoring activities. Hence, investors are will-
ing to pay a higher price for shares of firms that employ inde-
pendent accountants. This explains why firms voluntarily con-
tracted with independent accountants long before there was a
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Accounting has another related function. If all firms dis-
closed financial information in different ways, interpreting the
information, as well as making inter-firm comparisons, would be
difficult. Accounting provides a common language and, thus,
lowers the costs of processing information.
II.
Firms are willing to bear the costs of hiring independent ac-
countants because these costs are less than the decrease in the
cost of capital. If an accounting firm acquires a reputation for
lack of independence, however, there will be no decrease in the
cost of capital when it is retained. Rational investors will view
the disclosures by a firm that has retained an accounting firm
with a dishonest reputation as if no accounting firm were re-
tained. Indeed, the retention of such an accounting firm might
be perceived by investors as worse than not hiring any account-
ing firm because it will be viewed as a signal that the firm in-
tends to mislead investors. This will lead to an increase in the
cost of capital.
The above discussion illustrates why accountants have
strong incentives to maintain a reputation for independence and
why firms have equally strong incentives to retain accountants
with such reputations. Accountants are selling monitoring ser-
vices, and the price that firms are willing to pay for these ser-
vices is a function of how much investors value the services pro-
vided. In other words, unless accounting firms maintain a
reputation for independence, they have nothing of value to sell.
This is not to suggest that conflicts of interest never arise.
For purposes of analysis, it is useful to identify two potential
types of conflicts of interest. The first is where a firm wants to
misrepresent its financial situation and tells its accountant, in
effect, to go along or lose the business. In this situation, the ac-
counting firm must balance the short-term loss of revenues if it
refuses to go along against the damage to its reputation if it par-
ticipates in the scheme. The possibility that the firm's profit-
maximizing strategy is to cooperate with the wrongdoers is
largely a function of the amount of diversity in the firm's client
[Vol. 52:1051
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base. An accounting firm with one client will be much more will-
ing to make compromises to keep the client than will a firm
where no one client represents a large percentage of its revenues.
Thus, if all else is equal, large accounting firms will be more in-
dependent than small accounting firms, which no doubt helps to
explain the popularity of the big eight accounting firms for pub-
lic companies.
A second type of conflict occurs when an employee of an
accounting firm, rather than the firm as a whole, decides to par-
ticipate in a fraudulent scheme. While reputational concerns
also act as a constraint on this type of behavior by individuals, it
is more likely that individuals will conclude that it is essential to
keep a particular client than for the firm to have this view. The
economic fortunes of an individual may be tied to one client
even if the same is not true for the accounting firm as a whole. It
is important to recognize, however, that accounting firms that
want to maintain their reputations for independence will be
aware of this concern and will set up internal systems to monitor
the performance of its employees. The incentives of the account-
ing firm in this regard are no different than any other type of
firm that makes expenditures to protect the value of its brand
name.
Recently, concern has been expressed over the effect of
"lowballing" - charging a low price for initial engagements -
on auditor independence. The argument appears to be that if
the initial price charged is too low, accountants will have to take
whatever steps are necessary to keep the client in order to
recoup the losses from the initial engagement. To minimize this
perceived threat to auditor independence, some members of the
Securities and Exchange Commission have proposed regulations
limiting price competition among accounting firms.
This concern about the effect of lowballing on independence
is misplaced. The flaw in the argument is the assumption that
charging a low price in the early period will make it more profit-
able not to be independent in later periods. The costs (revenue
foregone) in the early period, however, are sunk; they do not af-
fect incentives in later periods. Put differently, if it is profitable
in the present not to be independent (although note the reasons
discussed above while this will generally not be true), it is irrele-
vant what prices were charged in the past.
In reality, lowballing is probably nothing more than a form
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of discounting that is common in many markets and is under-
taken for the purpose of inducing purchasers to hire a particular
firm. Such discounting reflects a competitive market in account-
ing services and, as emphasized above, has no effect on indepen-
dence. Any attempt by the SEC to prohibit price competition by
accounting firms thus cannot be justified by the need to protect
investors. Rather, such an attempt would be more accurately
characterized as enforcement of a price-fixing cartel among ac-
counting firms to the detriment of investors who must pay
higher prices to hire accountants.
III.
Suits against accountants are becoming increasingly com-
mon. It is now commonplace, for example, for accountants to be
joined as defendants in securities fraud class action suits. The
typical pattern is that, after a decline in a particular industry
(energy and computers being the best examples in recent years),
securities fraud suits are filed against many of the firms in the
industry and their accountants alleging that investors who pur-
chased during the class period did so at artificially inflated
prices because of some defect in disclosure.
While some of these suits undoubtedly have merit, the fact
that suits are filed against a high percentage of firms in a partic-
ular industry (and their accountants) suggests that many are
frivolous. Unless there is some amazing coincidence whereby a
high percentage of wrongdoers wind up in particular industries,
and they are responsible for the timing of declines in stock
prices (rather than, say, the decline in the price of oil), it is im-
plausible that the problems of an entire industry are attributa-
ble to disclosure decisions by firms and their accountants. Such
suits are a perversion of the securities laws, which are designed
to deter wrongdoing and compensate victims, not to provide in-
surance against stock price declines.
Nevertheless, casual empiricism suggests that these suits are
almost always settled, and typically for more than nominal
amounts. This is hardly surprising given the staggering potential
exposure in open market securities cases and the enormous cost
of litigation. As a result, the rational strategy will frequently be
to settle, even in cases that lack merit.
What must be understood, however, is that use of the secur-
ities laws to force accountants to provide insurance against stock
price declines is not costless. When calculating the price of their
[Vol. 52:1051
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services, accountants will now charge for the insurance being
provided. Similarly, accountants will take steps that do not in-
crease the quality of monitoring services but create a paper trail
that is of value in litigation. Such "defensive accounting," along
with the cost of the insurance premium, will create higher prices.
Investors, the supposed beneficiaries of securities fraud actions,
will likely bear a large percentage of these increased costs.
From the investors' perspective, these costs are worth bear-
ing if the benefits of securities fraud actions are sufficiently
large. The purported benefit of securities fraud suits against ac-
countants is that the threat of liability will cause accountants to
provide a higher quality service. There is some truth to this
claim. The accounting firm contemplating what to do when a cli-
ent pressures it to acquiesce in a questionable scheme might be
deterred by the threat of liability in some situations where the
concern over damage to reputation might not have been enough.
But the situation is more complicated.
The deterrent effect of liability rules is the difference be-
tween the probability of incurring liability when performance
meets the required standard and the probability of incurring lia-
bility when performance is below the required standard. Thus,
the stronger is the probability that liability will be incurred
when performance is adequate, the weaker is the deterrent effect
of liability rules. Why offer a higher quality product if you will
be sued regardless whenever there is a precipitous decline in
stock prices? While it is impossible to quantify exactly how seri-
ous this problem of error costs is, the above discussion concern-
ing the industry-wide nature of securities fraud suits suggests
the problem is substantial. And if error costs are substantial, it
is likely that the claimed deterrent effect of liability rules has
been exaggerated.
Thus securities fraud suits against accountants which are
justified as a form of investor protection may have precisely the
opposite effect. Investors bear increased costs without obtaining
any offsetting benefits. Possible reforms include restrictions on
the availability of the class action device, modifications of rules
governing the awarding of costs in litigation, and clarification of
the fault standard so that liability can be imposed only when an
intent to defraud has been proved. A fuller understanding of the
effects of liability rules in accounting and other contexts, and of
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the effects of possible reforms, are rich areas for further
research.
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